I'm a PhD candidate in philosophy at MIT. In Fall 2019 I'll become a Fellow by Examination (JRF) at Magdalen College, Oxford, and then in January 2021 I will start as an assistant professor in the philosophy department at the  University of Pittsburgh.

I work on epistemology, logic, language, and their intersections. In epistemology, I'm interested in what we should think (the belief-credence connection), why we should think it (foundations), and what we should think about what we should think (higher-order uncertainty). In logic, I'm interested in various models of these things—especially combinations of probability theory and epistemic logic. In language, I'm interested in various statements about them—especially the semantics and pragmatics behind ascriptions and denials of knowledge, belief, and probability.

My dissertation introduces a general framework for studying higher-order uncertainty—uncertainty about what you should think.  Part one argues that higher-order uncertainty is rational—and that this fact explains the epistemic force of peer (dis)agreement.  Part two shows how to build a well-behaved theory of higher-order uncertainty—one that allows such self-doubt while still guaranteeing the guidance-value of rationality. Part three​ applies this theory to the psychology of human reasoning, arguing that the rationality of higher-order uncertainty shows that certain forms of predictable polarization can be rational.

​More generally, I'm interested in what epistemology can teach us about human reasoning. Psychologists and cognitive scientists claim to have shown that people exhibit over one hundred different irrational reasoning biases. But it turns out that careful epistemological thinking shows that at least some of these "biases" are not irrational at all.  I'm interested in using sophisticated models of rationality---in particular, ones that incorporate higher-order uncertainty---to investigate just how many of these "biases" are in fact perfectly rational. 

Here's my CV.