I'm a Fellow by Examination (aka JRF) at Magdalen College, Oxford. I'm also an assistant professor in the philosophy department at the University of Pittsburgh---starting January 2021 I will be there full time.  I received my PhD from MIT. 

I work on epistemology, logic, language, and their intersections. In epistemology, I'm interested in what we should think (the belief-credence connection), why we should think it (foundations), and what we should think about what we should think (higher-order uncertainty). In logic, I'm interested in various models of these things—especially combinations of probability theory and epistemic logic. In language, I'm interested in various statements about them—especially the semantics and pragmatics behind ascriptions and denials of knowledge, belief, and probability.

My dissertation introduced a general framework for studying higher-order uncertainty—uncertainty about what you should think.  Part one argued that higher-order uncertainty is rational—and that this fact explains the epistemic force of peer (dis)agreement.  Part two showed how to build a well-behaved theory of higher-order uncertainty—one that allows such self-doubt while still guaranteeing the guidance-value of rationality. Part three​ applied this theory to the psychology of human reasoning, arguing that the rationality of higher-order uncertainty shows that certain forms of predictable polarization can be rational.

​More generally, I'm interested in what epistemology can teach us about human reasoning. Psychologists and cognitive scientists claim to have shown that people exhibit over one hundred different irrational reasoning biases. But it turns out that careful epistemological thinking shows that at least some of these "biases" are not irrational at all.  I'm interested in using sophisticated models of rationality---in particular, ones that incorporate higher-order uncertainty---to investigate just how many of these "biases" are in fact perfectly rational. 

Here's my CV.