I'm a PhD candidate in philosophy at MIT. I work on epistemology, logic, language, and their intersections.  

In epistemology, I'm interested in what we should think (the belief-credence connection), why we should think it (foundations), and what we should think about what we should think (higher-order uncertainty). In logic, I'm interested in various models of these things—especially combinations of probability theory and epistemic logic. In language, I'm interested in various statements about them—especially the semantics and pragmatics behind ascriptions and denials of knowledge, belief, and probability.

My dissertation introduces a general framework for studying higher-order uncertainty—uncertainty about what you should think.  Part one argues that higher-order uncertainty is rational—and that this fact explains the epistemic force of peer (dis)agreement.  Part two identifies a tension between (1) the rationality of higher-order uncertainty and (2) the fact that rationality must be a guide, and argues that no current theory succeeds in navigating it.  Part three proposes a middle way: it shows how to build a theory of rationality that (provably) both allows higher-order uncertainty and guarantees the guidance-value of rationality.

​Finally, I'm interested in applying the lessons from these epistemological investigations to other areas.  For example, psychologists and cognitive scientists claim to have shown that people exhibit over one hundred different irrational reasoning biases. But it turns out that careful epistemological thinking shows that at least some of these "biases" are not irrational at all.  I'm interested in using sophisticated models of rationality---in particular, ones that incorporate higher-order uncertainty---to investigate just how many of these "biases" are in fact perfectly rational. 

Here's my CV.