Work in Progress
Splitting the (In)Difference: Why Fine-Tuning Supports Design (with Chris Dorst). Forthcoming. Thought
Be modest: you're living on the edge. 2022. Analysis. 81 (4): 611–621.
Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain. 2020. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 100 (3): 586–632.
Abominable KK Failures. 2019. Mind. 128 (512): 1227–1259
Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy. 2019. Mind. 128 (509): 175–211
Higher-Order Uncertainty. 2019. In M. Skipper & A. Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford University Press, 35–61.
Can the Knowledge Norm Co-Opt the Opt-Out? 2014. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (4): 273–282.
Handbook Articles and Reviews
Higher-Order Evidence. Forthcoming. In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook for the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.
Review of Epistemic Consequentialism , by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn (eds.). 2020. Philosophical Review 129 (3): 484-489.
Thinking properly is hard. Sometimes I mess it up. I definitely messed it up yesterday. I’ll likely mess it up tomorrow. Maybe I’m messing it up right now.
I’m guessing you’re like me. If so, then we’re both modest: we’re unsure whether we’re thinking rationally. And, it seems, we should be: given our knowledge of our own limitations, it’s rational for us to be unsure whether we’re thinking rationally. How, then, should we think? How does uncertainty about what it’s rational to think affect what it’s rational to think? And how do our judgments of people’s (ir)rationality change once we realize that it can be rational to be modest? My dissertation makes a start on answering those questions.