

## Knowledge and Normal Luminosity

Jack Spencer

1/ The condition of being  $F$  is *luminous* just if, necessarily, if one is  $F$ , then one is in a position to know that one is  $F$ . The condition of being  $F$  is *normally luminous* just if, necessarily, if one is  $F$ , and one is in normal circumstances, then one is in a position to know that one is  $F$ . This paper argues that feeling cold is normally luminous.

2/ Timothy Williamson argues that the condition of feeling cold is not luminous, and if his argument shows that the condition of feeling cold is not luminous, the argument also shows that the condition of feeling cold is not normally luminous.

A belief is *safe* just if it could not easily have been false. Knowing entails believing – necessarily, if one knows that  $p$ , then one believes that  $p$ . And, according to Williamson, knowing entails safely believing – necessarily, if one knows that  $p$ , then one safely believes that  $p$ .

Safe conditions stands to safe belief as luminous conditions stands to knowledge – the condition of being  $F$  is *safe* just if, necessarily, if one is  $F$ , then one is in a position to safely believe that one is  $F$ . Being in a position is upward monotonic – if  $\Phi$ -ing entails  $\Psi$ -ing, then being in a position to  $\Phi$  entails being in a position to  $\Psi$ . So, if knowing entails safely believing, then being in a position to know entails being in a position to safely believe. And, if being in a position to know entails being in a position to safely believe, then every luminous condition is safe.

The condition of feeling cold is not safe, however, as Williamson shows.

Consider a morning on which one feels freezing cold at dawn, very slowly warms up, and feels hot by noon. One changes from feeling cold to not feeling cold, and from being in a position to know that one feels cold to not being in a position to know that one feels cold. If the condition that one feels cold is luminous, these changes are exactly simultaneous. Suppose that one's feelings of heat and cold change so slowly during the process that one is not aware of any change in them over one millisecond. Suppose also that throughout the process one thoroughly considers how cold or hot one feels. (Williamson 2000: 96-7).

Let  $t_0, t_1, \dots, t_n$  be a series of times at one millisecond intervals from dawn to noon. One's powers of discrimination are not perfect. One cannot discriminate between how cold one feels at  $t_i$  and how cold one feels at  $t_{i+1}$ . Being in a position to safely believe thus implies having a margin for error – if at  $t_i$  one is in a position to safely believe that one feels cold, then at  $t_{i+1}$  one feels cold. But feeling cold does not imply having a margin for error – for some  $t_i$ , at  $t_i$  one feels cold, and it is not the case that at  $t_{i+1}$  one feels cold. The condition of feeling cold is not safe.

The same argument shows that the condition of feeling cold is not normally safe. The condition of being  $F$  is *normally safe* just if, necessarily, if one is  $F$ , and one is in normal circumstances, one is in a position to know that one is  $F$ . Circumstances are normal throughout the slowly warming morning –

if at  $t_i$  one feels cold, then at  $t_i$  one feels cold, and one is in normal circumstances. So the condition of feeling cold is not normally safe, either.

If knowing entails safely believing, then every luminous condition is safe, and every normally luminous condition is normally safe. But I think that the condition of feeling cold is normally luminous, despite not being normally safe, for I deny that knowing entails safely believing.

3/ Is there any reason to think that knowing entails safely believing?

Proponents of the claim often appeal to reliability. An unsafe belief is too unreliable to constitute knowledge, they say. But appeals to reliability cut little ice. An unsafe belief lacks one kind of reliability – it easily could have been false. But often, a belief easily could have had a different basis. An unsafe belief thus might have another kind of reliability – an unsafe belief might be such that it could not easily have had the same basis and been false. The crucial question is whether a belief can constitute knowledge if, though the belief easily could have been false, the belief could not easily have had the same basis and been false, and bare appeals to reliability do nothing to settle that question.

A better motivation appeals to Gettier cases. A *Gettier* case is a case in which a justified true belief falls short of knowledge. There are alleged to be two sorts of Gettier cases, classical and environmental. In a classical case, one's belief is not connected to the truth. For example:

Broken Clock. Walking down a hallway at school, one comes to wonder what time it is. One knows that there is a clock in each classroom, and there are three classrooms near, A,

B, and C. Choosing more or less at random, one opens classroom B and glances at the clock therein. The clock says 2:05. One comes to believe that it is 2:05 accordingly. One's belief is true – it is 2:05. And one's belief is justified – one has no reason to suspect that any of the three clocks are broken. The three clocks are not all unbroken, however. Though the clocks in classrooms A and C are unbroken, the clock in classroom B is broken.

In an environmental case, one's belief is connected to the truth only luckily. For example:

Lucky Clock. Walking down a hallway at school, one comes to wonder what time it is. One knows that there is a clock in each classroom, and there are three classrooms near, A, B, and C. Choosing more or less at random, one opens classroom B and glances at the clock therein. The clock says 2:05. One comes to believe that it is 2:05 accordingly. One's belief is true – it is 2:05. And one's belief is justified – one has no reason to suspect that any of the three clocks are broken. The three clocks are not all unbroken, however. Though the clock in classroom B is unbroken, the clocks in classrooms A and C are broken.

Classical and environmental cases differ variously. Being lucky to be looking at an unbroken clock is not the same as being unlucky to be looking at broken clock. But one thing that unites classical and environmental cases is a lack of safe belief. If one easily could have glanced at a broken clock, and one's belief about the time is formed by the method of trusting the clock one glances at, then one's belief about the time easily could have been false. So if, as epistemological

orthodoxy tells us, knowledge is lacking both in classical cases, such as Broken Clock, and environmental cases, such as Lucky Clock, then the claim that knowing entails safely believing can be motivated as the best explanation for why knowledge is lacking both in classical and environmental cases.

4/ I think that environmental cases are not Gettier cases. The argument that convinces me appeals to bases.

Bases are facts that explain by justifying. If some facts are the basis of one doing something, then those facts explain one doing the thing in a special, sense-making way.

The things that can be done on a basis are many and varied. Actions that are intentional are one example. If one is screaming intentionally, the fact that one was treated unkindly may be part of the basis of one screaming. Actions that are not intentional are another example. If one is screaming not intentionally, the fact that one was treated unkindly may be part of the basis of one screaming. Other examples include believing, wanting, and the feeling of various emotions. The fact that the neighbor purchased a new car may be part of the basis of one believing that the neighbor got a promotion. It also may be part of the basis of one feeling jealous.

There is a constitutive connection between the bases of the things one does and the things one knows. Basing entails knowing – necessarily, if one does something partly on the basis of the fact that  $p$ , then one knows that  $p$  (cf. Hyman 1999/XXXX) And the content of the justified true beliefs that are alleged to fall short of knowledge in environmental cases can be part of bases.

The contrast between classical and environmental cases in this regard is sharp. Consider, again, Broken Clock. One is in a classroom, looking at broken clock that says 2:05. Suppose that one then starts hurrying, saying aloud, "Gosh, I'm late! It's

already 2:05!" What facts can be part of the basis of one starting to hurry? The fact that one believes that it is 2:05 can be part of the basis. The fact that the clock says that it is 2:05 can be part of the basis. But the fact that it is 2:05 cannot be. One believes that it is 2:05, and it is 2:05, but it is not true that one starts hurrying because it is 2:05.

There is another notion of interest, the ground on which one does something. The ground on which one does something is, roughly, what one takes the basis to be. Only facts can be parts of bases. Bases explain, and only facts can explain. But falsehoods are often part of the grounds on which one does something. Suppose that one, overcome with frustration, marches to the boss' office. That the boss is in the office is part of the ground of one marching to the boss's office, even if the boss is not in the office.

That it is 2:05 may be part of the ground on which one starts hurrying, in Broken Clock. Indeed, presumably it is. One believes that it is 2:05, and, presumably, one believes that one is starting to hurry because it is 2:05. But the fact that it is 2:05 is not connected to one starting to hurry in the way that it would have to be to be part of the basis of one starting to hurry. That it is 2:05 is not even a cause of one starting to hurry.

Environmental cases pattern differently, however. Consider, again, Lucky Clock. One is in classroom B, looking at an unbroken clock that says 2:05. Suppose that one then starts hurrying, saying aloud, "Gosh, I'm late! It's already 2:05!" What facts can be part of the basis of one starting to hurry. The fact that one believes that it 2:05 can be part of the basis of one starting to hurry. The fact that the clock says 2:05 can be part of the basis of one starting to hurry. But the fact that

it is 2:05 also can be. It is true that one starts hurrying because it is 2:05, in Lucky Clock.

The same contrast arises in other pairs of cases. Consider this classical case, discussed by John Hyman:

Re-run. Henry is watching television on the day of the men's Wimbledon final. The television shows McEnroe beating Connors, and indeed McEnroe *has* just beaten Connors for this year's championship. However, unbeknownst to Henry, what he is watching is a re-run of last year's Wimbledon final. It is on the basis of seeing that match that Henry believes that McEnroe is this year's Wimbledon champion. (Hyman 1999: 447-8)

Suppose that Henry jumps for joy. What facts can be part of the basis of Henry jumping for joy? The fact that he believes that McEnroe won this year's championship can be part of the basis of him jumping for joy. But the fact that McEnroe won this year's championship cannot be. That McEnroe won this year's Wimbledon final is part of the ground of Henry jumping for Joy. Henry believes that McEnroe won this year's Wimbledon final, and presumably believes that he is jumping for joy because McEnroe won this year's Wimbledon final. But the fact that McEnroe won this year's Wimbledon final is not connected to Henry jumping for joy in the way that it would have to be to be part of the basis. That McEnroe won this year's Wimbledon final is not even a cause of Henry jumping for joy.

But contrast Re-run with the following case, discussed by Dustin Locke:

Re-run Hotel. Henry is watching television on the day of the men's Wimbledon final. The television shows McEnroe

beating Connor, and indeed McEnroe *has* just beaten Connors for this year's championship. However, unbeknownst to Henry, he is in re-run hotel. Nearly all of the rooms in re-run hotel are showing re-runs of last year's Wimbledon final. Just by chance, Henry has been assigned to one of the few rooms in re-run hotel that is playing this year's match. (Locke 2024: 223)

Suppose that Henry jumps for joy. What facts can be part of the basis of Henry jumping for joy? The fact that he believes that McEnroe won this year's championship can be part of the basis of him jumping for joy. But the fact that McEnroe won this year's championship also can be.

Of course one could take environmental cases as a reason to reject the alleged constitutive connection between basing and knowing. But there is a good explanation for why knowledge wrongly seems to be lacking in environmental cases.

5/ It is often assumed that knowledge is the standard of belief. Unsafe beliefs are defective. If knowledge is the standard of belief, then a belief that constitutes knowledge is not defective. So, if knowledge is the standard of belief, then the evident defectiveness of the unsafe.

But knowledge is not the standard of belief. The standard of belief is safe knowledge.

Safe knowledge is structurally like safe belief. Safe belief is belief that is safely true – a belief constitutes *safe belief* just if it could not easily have been false. Safe knowledge is belief that is safely knowledge – a belief constitutes *safe knowledge* just if it could not easily have fallen short of knowledge. Safe belief is belief that is not



danger of constituting false belief. Safe knowledge is belief that is not in danger of constituting ignorance.

It should not be surprising that the standard of belief is safe knowledge, for safely conforming to the primary norm is very often the prevailing standard.

Take driving, for example. There is a primary norm, an injunction against rear-ending the car one tails.

Tail at a positive distance!

The primary norm begets a secondary norm, an injunction against unsafely conforming to the primary norm.

Safely tail at a positive distance!

If one's abilities are limited as regards to tailing at a positive distance, if one has imperfect control over the distance between one and the car one tails, then one can violate the secondary norm while conforming to the primary norm, unsafely tailing at a positive distance, tailing in a way that easily could have led one to violate the primary norm. If one's abilities are limited as regards to tailing at a positive distance, then one conforms to the secondary norms only if one tails at a *safe* distance.

The mechanism of anti-recklessness thus makes the standard for driving more demanding than the primary norm. One drive defectively if one recklessly tails at a positive distance. If one's powers of tailing are limited, and one tailgates, then one drive defectively, even if one does not rear-end the car one tails. Driving meets the standard only if conforms to both norms.

This structure is ubiquitous. Take painting. There is a primary norm, an injunction not to buy too little paint.

Buy enough paint to complete the job!

The primary norm begets a secondary norm, an injunction against unsafely conforming to the primary norm.

Safely buy enough paint for the job!

If one's abilities are limited as regards to buying enough paint for the job, if one cannot perfectly estimating how much paint a job requires, then one can violate the secondary norm while conforming to the primary norm, unsafely buying enough paint to complete the job, buying paint in a way that could easily have led one to violate the primary norm. If one's abilities are limited as regard to buying enough paint for a job, then one conforms to the secondary norm only if one buys enough paint to *safely* complete the job.

The mechanism of anti-recklessness thus makes the standard of buying paint for a job more demanding than the primary norm. One buys paint for the job defectively if one recklessly buys enough paint for the job. Buying paint for a job meets the standard only if conforms to both norms.

The same structure plays out with regard to belief. There is a primary norm, an injunction against ignorantly believing.

Believe knowingly!

The primary norm begets a secondary norm, an injunction against unsafely conforming to the primary norm.

Safely believe knowingly!

If one's abilities are limited as regards to believing knowingly, if one cannot perfectly believe when and only when one knows, then one can violate the secondary norm while conforming to the primary norm, safely believing knowingly, believing in a way that easily could have led one to violate the primary norm. If one's abilities are limited as regard to believing knowingly, then one conforms to the secondary norm only if one believes only what one safely knows.

The mechanism of anti-recklessness thus makes the standard of belief stronger than the primary norm. One believes defectively if one recklessly believes knowingly. Believing meets the standard only if conforms to both norms.

What is lacking in environmental cases is belief that meets the standard. Safe knowledge entails safe belief – necessarily, if one safely knows that  $p$ , then one safely believes that  $p$ . Safe knowledge is the standard of belief, and safe belief is lacking in environmental cases. Safe knowledge is thus lacking. But knowledge is not lacking. Environmental cases are knowing unsafely, cases in which one's belief constitutes knowledge but falls short of the standard of belief.

It is the presence of knowledge that makes the beliefs in environmental cases epistemically better than the beliefs in classical cases. Compare one's belief that it is 2:05, in Broken Clock, with one's belief that it is 2:05, in Lucky Clock, or one's belief that McEnroe won this year's championship in Re-run, with one's belief that McEnroe won this year's championship in Re-run Hotel. The latter is epistemically better. But what makes the latter epistemically better? Both beliefs are true. Both beliefs are justified. Both beliefs fall short of safe knowledge. The difference is knowledge. The beliefs in

environmental cases are epistemically better than the beliefs in classical cases because, unlike the beliefs in classical cases, they constitute knowledge.

6/ Because safely knowing entails safely believing, we can introduce a target against which Williamson argument succeeds. Say that the condition of being F is *brilliant* just if, necessarily, if one is F, then one is in a position to safely know that one is F. Brilliant conditions are scarce. Every brilliant condition is safe, and safe conditions are scarce. Perhaps, as Williamson says, no non-trivial condition is safe. But brilliance is not luminosity. A successful argument that the condition of feeling cold is not brilliant does not show that the condition is not luminous.

But is there a way to argue that the condition of feeling is normally luminous? In what follows, I develop an analogical argument.

7/ Consider a simple scale made of cheap plastic. Designed to detect whether the weight upon it is more than 100 pounds, it has just two displays, MORE and NOT MORE. The scale lives up to its design passably. For the most part, it displays (NOT) MORE just if the weight upon it is (not) more than 100 pounds. The scale is far from perfectly reliable, however. The scale is very reliable when the weight upon it is much more or more less than 100 pounds. But when the weight upon it is neither much more, nor much less than 100 pounds, it often displays incorrectly, displaying NOT MORE when the weight upon it is more than 100 pounds, or displaying MORE when the weight upon it is not more than 100 pounds.

Let us, for now, set vagueness aside, assuming, unrealistically, that it is never vague whether the weight upon

the scale is more than 100 pounds. And let us, for now, set stochasticity aside, assuming that what the scale displays is always nomologically necessitated by how things were before it displayed. What the scale display depends not just on the weight upon it. It also depends on, among other factors, the density of the weight upon it, where the weight is upon it, the ambient humidity, and the relative temperature of its spring to its lever. But let us suppose, for now, anyway, that the process the scale is a deterministic system.

Say that the condition of being *F* is *quasi-luminous* to the scale just if, necessarily, if the scale is *F*, then the scale is in a position to detect that it is *F*; and say that the condition of being *F* is *normally quasi-luminous* to the scale just if, necessarily, if the scale is *F*, and the scale is in normal circumstances, the scale is in a position to detect that it is *F*. I maintain that the condition of having a weight of (not) more than 100 pounds upon one is normally quasi-luminous to the scale.

**Normal Quasi-luminosity.** Necessarily, if the weight upon the scale is (not) more than 100 pounds, and the scale is in normal circumstances, then the scale is in a position to detect that the weight upon it is (not) more than 100 pounds.

The argument starts with the relation between detecting and correctly displaying. Detecting entails correctly displaying – necessarily, the scale detects that the weight upon it is (not) more than 100 pounds, then the scale correctly displays (NOT) MORE. Correctly displaying is normally sufficient for detecting:

**Normal Sufficiency.** Necessarily, if the scale correctly displays (NOT) MORE, and the scale is in normal circumstances, then the scale detects that the weight upon it is (not) more than 100 pounds.

But correctly displaying is not sufficient detecting:

**Insufficiency.** Possibly, the scale does not detect that the weight upon it is (not) more than 100 pounds, even though the scale correctly displays (NOT) MORE.

Detecting is not just getting it right. It is getting it right for the right reasons. The scale detects that the weight upon it is (not) more than 100 pounds only if its correct display is appropriately connected to the weight upon it, and the appropriate connection is basing.

**Detection.** Necessarily, the scale detects that the weight upon it is (not) more than 100 pounds if and only if the fact that the weight upon the scale is (not) more than 100 pounds is part of the basis of the scale displaying (NOT) MORE.

Some of the cases in which the appropriate connection is lacking are cases of deviant causation. The scale does not detect that the weight upon it is more than 100 pounds, though it correctly displays MORE, if the display is due not to the normal operation of the scale but to some external override. The scale does not detect that the weight upon it is more than 100 pounds, though it correctly displays MORE, if the weight being upon the scale breaks a piece of the scale, deviantly causing it to display MORE. But an appropriate connection between the

correct display and the weight can be lacking even in cases of non-deviant causation. The scale does not detect that the weight upon it is more than 100 pounds, though it correctly displays MORE, if the scale is in an elevator going up, or if the weight upon the scale is made of iron and there is a powerful magnet underneath the scale.

None of these oddities can arise in normal circumstances, however. Circumstances being normal entails that, if the scale displays correctly, then the correct display and the weight are appropriately connected – necessarily, if the scale correctly displays (NOT) MORE, and the scale is in normal circumstances, then the fact that the weight upon the scale is (not) more than 100 pounds is part of the basis of the scale displaying (NOT) MORE.

The display of the scale is *safe* just if it could not easily have been incorrect. If the weight upon the scale is neither much more, nor much less than 100 pounds, then the scale does not display safely. But what the foregoing shows us is that a scale does not have to display safely in order to detect. If a scale could detect only if it displayed safely, then it would be impossible for the scale to detect that the weight upon it is more than 100 pounds if the weight it was just more than 100 pounds. But that prediction flies in the face of what we know. If the scale is in normal circumstances, and you are about to place what you know to be just more than 100 pounds upon it, you should be unsure whether it will detect that the weight upon it is more than 100 pounds, not sure that it will not. If, in normal circumstances, the scale is 0.5 likely to correctly display MORE when a weight of (say) 101 pounds is upon it, then, in normal circumstances, the scale is 0.5 likely to detect that the weight upon it is more than 100 pounds when a weight of 101 pounds is upon it.

8/ Normal Sufficiency is the first premise of the argument for Normal Qausi-luminosity. The second premise is this:

**Normal Positionality.** Necessarily, if the weight upon the scale is (not) more than 100 pounds, and the scale is in normal circumstances, then the scale is in a position to correctly display (NOT) MORE in normal circumstances.

The second premise should not be controversial. Almost always, if  $p$  is true, and one is in normal circumstances, one is in a position to truly believe that  $p$  in normal circumstances. There are exceptional cases. If one cannot truly believe that  $p$ , then, even if  $p$  is true, one is not in a position to truly believe that  $p$ , and if one cannot believe that  $p$  in normal circumstances, then, even if one is normal circumstances, one is not in a position to believe that  $p$  in normal circumstances. But, almost always, if  $p$  is true, and one is in normal circumstances, one is in a position to truly believe that  $p$  in normal circumstances.

And what goes for believing goes for displaying. The scale would not be in a position to correctly display (NOT) MORE if it could not correctly display (NOT) MORE, and the scale would not be in a position to display (NOT) MORE in normal circumstances if the scale could not correctly display (NOT) MORE in normal circumstances. But, necessarily, if the scale is in normal circumstances, the scale can correctly display (NOT) MORE in normal circumstances. Hence, Normal Positionality holds.

If Normal Sufficiency holds, then correctly displaying (NOT) MORE in normal circumstances entails detecting that the weight upon one is (not) more than 100 pounds. If correctly displaying (NOT) MORE in normal circumstances entails detecting



that the weight upon one is (not) more than 100 pounds, then, because being in a position is upward monotonic, being in a position to correctly display (NOT) MORE in normal circumstances entails being in a position to detect that the weight upon one is (not) more than 100 pounds. Normal Sufficiency and Normal Positionality thus together imply Normal Quasi-luminosity.

9/ Normal Quasi-luminosity is a strong thesis. But even stronger principles are defensible.

Consider a precise scale, which can display any natural number, and consider the fine-grained condition of having  $x$  pounds (that is, no less than  $x - 0.5$  and less than  $x + 0.5$  pounds) upon one. If weight is normally quasi-luminous to the precise scale, then the following holds:

**Fine-Grained Normal Quasi-luminosity.** Necessarily, if the weight upon the precise scale is  $x$  pounds, and the precise scale is in normal circumstances, then the precise scale is in a position to detect that the weight upon it is  $x$  pounds.

The precise scale is made of the same cheap plastic that our original scale is. But the precise scale is much less reliable. The original scale usually displays correctly. The precise scale usually displays incorrectly. The precise scale is usually close. If the weight upon the precise scale is  $x$  pounds, the precise scale usually displays a natural number within three of  $x$ . But the precise scale displays incorrectly much more often than it displays correctly.

Nevertheless, Fine-Grained Normal Quasi-luminosity is true, for the analogs of Normal Sufficiency and Normal Positionality are both true.

**Fine-Grained Normal Sufficiency.** Necessarily, if the precise scale correctly displays  $X$ , and the precise scale is in normal circumstances, then the precise scale detects that the weight upon it is  $x$  pounds.

**Fine-Grained Normal Positionality.** Necessarily, if the weight upon the precise scale is  $x$  pounds, and the precise scale is in normal circumstances, then the precise scale is in a position to correctly displays  $X$  in normal circumstances.

The anti-safety point made above is here even clearer. If detecting required safely displaying, then the fine-grained scale would never detect. But that prediction flies in the face of what we know. The precise scale detects infrequently, but sometimes.

10/ The argument that weight is quasi-luminous to scale above does not generalize to scales that get it right for the wrong reasons even if normal circumstances.

Consider a noisy scale. Designed, like the original scale, to detect whether the weight upon it is more than 100 pounds, the noisy scale has two displays, MORE and NOT MORE. The noisy scale is more complex, however. It has both an internal and an external display. The weight upon it causes it to either internally display MORE or internally display NOT MORE, and then the internal display is transferred to the external display. And the transfer is noisy: on account of some stochastic process, the internal and external displays mismatch about 10% of the time.

Being in normal circumstances does not entail that the internal and external displays of the noisy scale match. There is no important difference between the circumstances that are normal for the original scale and the circumstances that are normal for the noisy scale. But there is an important difference between what follows from the original scale being in normal circumstances and what follows from the noisy scale being in normal circumstances. That the original scale correctly displays in normal circumstances entails that the original scale detects, but the same is not true of the noisy scale. The noisy scale does not detect if there is a mismatch between its internal and external display, and there can be a mismatch between its internal and external display in normal circumstances.

The argument that weight is normally quasi-luminous to the noisy scale goes by way of availability.

**Normal Availability.** Necessarily, if the weight upon the scale is (not) more than 100 pounds, and the noisy scale is in normal circumstances, then then the noisy scale is in a position to displays (NOT) MORE partly on the basis of the fact that the weight upon it is (not) more than 100 pounds.

Detection, recall, is a matter of basing.

**Base Detection.** Necessarily, if the scale correctly displays (NOT) MORE, and the scale is in normal circumstances, then the fact that the weight upon the scale is (not) more than 100 pounds is part of the basis of the scale displaying (NOT) MORE.

And, given the upward monotonicity of being in a position, Normal Availability and Base Detection together imply that weight is normally quasi-luminous to the noisy scale.

11/ The claim that weight is normally quasi-luminous to scale lends some credibility to the claim that feeling cold is normally luminous.