

KEVIN DORST

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AREAS

AOS: Epistemology, Cognitive Science
AOC: Philosophy of Language, Political and Social Philosophy

EMPLOYMENT

Assistant Professor, MIT	2022 – present
Assistant Professor, University of Pittsburgh	2019 – 2022
Fellow by Examination (JRF), Magdalen College, Oxford University	2019 – 2020

AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

Humboldt Research Fellowship, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy	2024 – 2026
Resident Fellow, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh	2019 – 2022

EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Philosophy, MIT (Minor: Mathematical Logic) Dissertation: <i>Modest Epistemology</i> Committee: Roger White (Chair), Branden Fitelson, Kieran Setiya, Robert Stalnaker	2014 – 2019
B.A. in Philosophy & Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis <i>Summa Cum Laude</i> . Thesis: <i>Reviving Joyce's Error Theory</i>	2010 – 2014

PUBLICATIONS

* = co-first-authors

2023. 'Rational Polarization'. *The Philosophical Review* 132 (3): 355–458.
2023. 'Being Rational and Being Wrong'. *Philosophers' Imprint* 23 (3): 1–25.
2022. 'Splitting the (In)Difference: Why Fine-Tuning Supports Design'. Chris Dorst* and Kevin Dorst*. *Thought*. 11 (1): 14–23.
2022. 'Good Guesses'. Kevin Dorst* and Matthew Mandelkern*. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. 105 (3): 581–618

9. 2022. ‘(Almost) All Evidence is Higher-Order Evidence’. Brian Hedden* and Kevin Dorst*. *Analysis* 82 (3): 417–425.
8. 2022. ‘Assertion is Weak’. Matthew Mandelkern and Kevin Dorst. *Philosophers’ Imprint* 22 (19): 1–20 .
7. 2021. ‘Be modest: You’re living on the edge’. *Analysis* 81 (4): 611–621.
6. 2021. ‘Deference Done Better’. Kevin Dorst*, Benjamin A. Levinstein*, Bernhard Salow*, Brooke Husic, and Branden Fitelson. *Philosophical Perspectives* 35 (1): 99–150.
5. 2020. ‘Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain’. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. 100 (3): 586–632.
4. 2019. ‘Abominable KK Failures’. *Mind* 128 (512): 1227–1259.
3. 2019. ‘Higher-Order Uncertainty’. In M. Skipper and A. Steglich-Petersen (eds.), *Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays*, Oxford University Press, 35–61.
2. 2019. ‘Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy’. *Mind* 128 (509): 175–211.
1. 2014. ‘Can the Knowledge Norm Co-Opt the Opt-Out?’ *Thought* 3 (4): 273–282.

PUBLIC WRITING

- [Stranger Apologies](#) blog, including the series [Reasonably Polarized: Why politics is more rational than you think](#).
- ‘How America Polarized’. *Arc Digital*. February 3, 2021.
- ‘The Other Side is More Rational Than You Think’. *Arc Digital*. September 25, 2020.
- ‘The Rational Question’. *The Oxonian Review*. March 14, 2020.
- ‘Why Rational People Polarize’. *Phenomenal World*. January 24, 2019

REVIEWS AND HANDBOOK ARTICLES

- ‘Higher-Order Evidence’. Forthcoming in Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook for the Philosophy of Evidence*, Routledge.
- Review of *Epistemic Consequentialism* by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn (eds.). 2020. *Philosophical Review* 129 (3): 484–489.

Erdos number: 4. (Dorst → Husic → Wales → Salamon → Erdos.)

PRESENTATIONS

Bayesian Bias

- Concepts and Cognition Lab, Princeton University, November 2023
- Human Cooperation Lab, MIT Sloan, March 2023

- Northwestern Cognitive Science Program, February 2023
- NYU Mind & Language Workshop, February 2023

Bayesians Commit the Gambler's Fallacy

- Computational Cognitive Neuroscience Lab, Harvard University, November 2023
- Formal and Experimental Philosophy (FAX3), University of Missouri, October 2023
- National University of Singapore Formal Epistemology Workshop. May 2023.
- University of Birmingham Philosophical Society. April 2023
- Pittsburgh Formal Epistemology Workshop. April 2023
- Bochum Epistemology Seminar. Ruhr-University Bochum, June 2020

What is Adaptive?

- Workshop on Adaptive Decision-Making, MIT, September 2023

What's New in Deference and Chance?

- The International Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science and Technology (CLMPST). Buenos Aires, July 2023.

The Case for Political Irrationality is Overstated

- Sociology of Paradigm Change Conference. MIT, May 2023.

Polarization Is Not (Standard) Bayesian

- The Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Pittsburgh, June 2023.
- Northwestern Epistemology Group. February 2023
- Philosophy of Science Association, Pittsburgh, November 2022

Bayesian Ambiguity

- University of Maryland College Park, October 2022

What's Puzzling about Polarization?

- *Knowledge Resistance*, Stockholm University, August 2022

Breaking Bayes

- NYU, February 2022
- Texas Tech University, February 2022
- MIT, January 2022

Ambiguity and Uncertainty

- LSE Choice group, November 2021
- Northeastern Epistemology Workshop, November 2021

Splitting the (In)Difference: Why Fine-Tuning Supports Design (with Chris Dorst)

- Pacific APA, Vancouver, April 2022

Rational Polarization

- Directions of polarization, social norms, and trust in societies, MIT, December 2023
- Rutgers Epistemology Seminar, March 2023
- University of Arizona Epistemology Seminar, February 2023
- Conceptual Foundations of Conflict Project, USC, November 2022
- LanCog Group at the University of Lisbon, March 2021
- Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, March 2021
- University of Missouri, February 2021
- University of Oxford Jowett Society, November 2019
- Pacific APA, Vancouver, April 2019
- National University of Singapore, February 2019
- University of Pittsburgh, February 2019
- Indiana University, January 2019
- Prindle Institute for Ethics at DePaul University, June 2018

Good Guesses (with Matthew Mandelkern)

- Society for Philosophy and Psychology. Online. July 2021
- *Sinn und Bedeutung*. University College London. September 2020
- University of London Formal Philosophy Group. June 2020

Being Rational and Being Wrong (Formerly: “Overconfidence in Overconfidence”)

- Fordham Epistemology and Ethics Workshop, Fordham University, September 2020
- Formal Epistemology Workshop, University of California at Irvine, May 2020
- Pacific APA (Symposium), San Francisco, April 2020 [Canceled due to Covid-19]
- LSE Choice Group. London, February 2020.
- University of Bristol, December 2019
- Legal Epistemology Workshop, University of Sydney, August 2019

Pandemic Polarization is Reasonable

- Social (Distance) Epistemology. Northwestern University, April 2020

Evidence of Evidence: A Higher-Order Approach (Branden Fitelson & Brooke Husic)

- Foundations of Probability Seminar, Rutgers, May 2019
- Ranch Metaphysics Workshop, Tucson, February 2019
- The Significance of Higher-Order Evidence, University of Cologne, September 2018
- Colloquium on Reasoning in a Social Context, University of Amsterdam, June 2018

Abominable KK Failures

- Central APA, Chicago, February 2018
- The Northern New England Philosophical Association, Stonehill College, November 2017

Two Cheers for Akrasia

- Eastern APA (Symposium), Savannah, January 2018

Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain

- Formal Epistemology Workshop, University of Washington, May 2017
- The St. Louis Area Conference on Reasons and Rationality, St. Louis, May 2017
- The Society for Exact Philosophy, University of Calgary, May 2017
- Pacific APA (Symposium), Seattle, April 2017
- Northern New England Philosophical Association, Keene State University, October 2016

Trustworthy E=K Implies KK

- Mark Shapiro Graduate Conference, Brown University, November 2016

Paradoxes of Higher-Order Evidence

- Central APA (Symposium), Chicago, March 2016
- Decisions, Games, and Logic, London, June 2015
- NYU-Columbia Graduate Conference, NYU, March 2015

A Contextualist Solution to Miner Disagreements

- Eastern APA, Washington DC, January 2016 (Marc Sanders Graduate Student Award)

Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy

- Epistemic Consequentialism: Problems and Prospects, University of Kent, June 2015
- Central APA, February 2015

Graded Epistemic Logic and a Barrier to Entailment

- The Philosophers' Cocoon Philosophy Conference, University of Tampa, July 2014

COMMENTS

- Sven Neth. 'Rational Aversion to Information'. Central APA, Chicago, February 2022
- Fabienne Peter. 'Political Deference'. Eastern APA, Baltimore, January 2022
- Mason Westfall. 'Polarization is Epistemically Innocuous.' *This But Unironically*. Online. July 2021
- James O. Weatherall. 'Why do Groups Polarize over Matters of Fact? What Models Can and Cannot Tell Us'. Yale Understanding the Nature of Inference Project, May 2021
- David Thorstad, 'Norms of Inquiry,' Harvard Workshop on Bounded Rationality, Boston, October 2019
- Nevin Climenhaga, 'The Structure of Epistemic Probabilities', Eastern APA, Baltimore, January 2017
- Sophie Horowitz, 'Epistemic Value and the "Jamesian Goals"', St. Louis Area Conference on Reasons and Rationality, St. Louis, May 2015
- Ray Briggs, 'An Accuracy-Dominance Argument for Conditionalization', MITing of the Minds, Cambridge MA, January 2015
- Bob Beddor, 'An Attitudinal Semantics for Moral and Epistemic Evaluations', Philosophers' Cocoon Philosophy Conference, Tampa, July 2014

TEACHING

UNDERGRADUATE

- Problems in Philosophy. Fall 2022; Spring 2022.
- Rationality. Fall 2023; Spring 2022
- Theory of Knowledge. Fall 2021; Spring 2021.

GRADUATE

- Imprecision and Irrationality (with Caspar Hare). Fall 2023.
- The Epistemology of Controversy (with Roger White). Fall 2022.
- The Epistemology of Bias. Fall 2021.
- Rationality. Spring 2021.

SERVICE

- Organizer of Adaptive Decision-Making Workshop, MIT, 2023
- Organizer of the Formal Epistemology Workshop (FEW), 2023
- Organizer of the Formal and Experimental Philosophy Workshop (FAX2), 2022
- Member of the Pitt Diversity Committee, 2021–2022.
- Organizer of the Pittsburgh Formal Epistemology Workshop (PFEW), 2021 – 2022.
- Organizer of Oxford Philosophy of Probability Reading Group, Spring 2020 – Fall 2020.
- Tutor for Philosophy in an Inclusive Key Summer Institute (PIKSI) Logic at Northeastern University, Summer 2018.
- MIT Conference Czar, 2018 – 2019.
- Organizer of the MIT Graduate Workshop, 2016 – 2018.
- Organizer of the MIT Epistemology Reading Group, 2015 – 2017
- Organizer of Harvard/MIT Graduate Conference, 2015.
- Referee for: *The Philosophical Review*, *Nou̇s*, *Mind*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *The Journal of Philosophy*, *Ethics*, PLOS ONE, *The Australian Journal of Philosophy*, *Analysis*, *Philosophy of Science*, *Philosophical Studies*, *The British Journal for Philosophy of Science*, *The Journal of Philosophical Logic*, *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, *Review of Philosophy and Psychology Routledge*, *Episteme*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Erkenntnis*, *Synthese*, *European Journal of Philosophy of Science*, and DFG (the German Research Foundation).