

# KEVIN DORST

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## AREAS

AOS: Epistemology · Cognitive Science · Logic  
AOC: Philosophy of Language · Political and Social Philosophy

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## EMPLOYMENT

Assistant Professor, MIT	2022 – present
Assistant Professor, University of Pittsburgh	2019 – 2022
Resident Fellow, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh	2019 – 2022
Fellow by Examination (JRF), Magdalen College, Oxford University	2019 – 2020

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## EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Philosophy, MIT (Minor: Mathematical Logic) Dissertation: <i>Modest Epistemology</i> Committee: Roger White (Chair), Branden Fitelson, Kieran Setiya, Robert Stalnaker	2014 – 2019
B.A. in Philosophy & Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis <i>Summa Cum Laude</i> . Thesis: <i>Reviving Joyce's Error Theory</i>	2010 – 2014

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## PUBLICATIONS

\* = co-first-authors

- ‘Splitting the (In)Difference: Why Fine-Tuning Supports Design’. Forthcoming. Chris Dorst\* and Kevin Dorst\*. *Thought*.
- ‘(Almost) All Evidence is Higher-Order Evidence’. Forthcoming. Brian Hedden\* and Kevin Dorst\*. *Analysis*.
- ‘Assertion is Weak’. Forthcoming. Matthew Mandelkern and Kevin Dorst. *Philosophers' Imprint*.
- ‘Good Guesses’. Forthcoming. Kevin Dorst\* and Matthew Mandelkern\*. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.
- ‘Be modest: You’re living on the edge’. 2022. *Analysis* 81 (4): 611-621.

- ‘Deference Done Better’. 2021. Kevin Dorst\*, Benjamin A. Levinstein\*, Bernhard Salow\*, Brooke Husic, and Branden Fitelson. *Philosophical Perspectives* 35 (1): 99-150.
- ‘Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain’. 2020. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. 100 (3): 586–632.
- ‘Abominable KK Failures’. 2019. *Mind* 128 (512): 1227–1259.
- ‘Higher-Order Uncertainty’. 2019. In M. Skipper and A. Steglich-Petersen (eds.), *Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays*, Oxford University Press, 35–61.
- ‘Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy’. 2019. *Mind* 128 (509): 175–211.
- ‘Can the Knowledge Norm Co-Opt the Opt-Out?’ 2014. *Thought* 3 (4): 273–282.

## PUBLIC WRITING

- *Stranger Apologies* blog, including the series *Reasonably Polarized: Why politics is more rational than you think*.
- ‘How America Polarized’. *Arc Digital*. February 3, 2021.
- ‘The Other Side is More Rational Than You Think’. *Arc Digital*. September 25, 2020.
- ‘The Rational Question’. *The Oxonian Review*. March 14, 2020.
- ‘Why Rational People Polarize’. *Phenomenal World*. January 24, 2019

## REVIEWS AND HANDBOOK ARTICLES

- ‘Higher-Order Evidence’. Forthcoming in Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook for the Philosophy of Evidence*, Routledge.
- Review of *Epistemic Consequentialism* by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn (eds.). 2020. *Philosophical Review* 129 (3): 484–489.

Erdos number: 4. (Dorst → Husic → Wales → Salamon → Erdos.)

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## PRESENTATIONS

### **Breaking Bayes**

- NYU, February 2022
- Texas Tech University, February 2022.
- MIT, January 2022

### **Ambiguity and Uncertainty**

- LSE Choice group, November 2021.
- Northeastern Epistemology Workshop, November 2021.

### **Fine-Tuning Divine Indifference** (with Chris Dorst)

- Pacific APA, Vancouver, April 2021.

### **Guessing and Overconfidence** (with Matthew Mandelkern)

- Epistemology Reading Group (ERG), MIT, September 2021.

### **Rational Polarization**

- LanCog Group at the University of Lisbon, March 2021.
- Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, March 2021.
- University of Missouri, February 2021.
- University of Oxford Jowett Society, November 2019.
- Pacific APA, Vancouver, April 2019.
- National University of Singapore, February 2019.
- University of Pittsburgh, February 2019.
- Indiana University, January 2019.
- Prindle Institute for Ethics at Depauw University, June 2018.

### **Good Guesses** (with Matthew Mandelkern)

- Society for Philosophy and Psychology. Online. July 2021.
- *Sinn und Bedeutung*. University College London. September 2020.
- University of London Formal Philosophy Group. June 2020.

### **Being Rational and Being Wrong** (Formerly: “Overconfidence in Overconfidence”)

- Fordham Epistemology and Ethics Workshop, Fordham University, September 2020.
- Formal Epistemology Workshop, University of California at Irvine, May 2020.
- Pacific APA (Symposium), San Francisco, April 2020. [Canceled due to Covid-19]
- LSE Choice Group. London, February 2020.
- University of Bristol, December 2019.
- Legal Epistemology Workshop, University of Sydney, August 2019.

### **The Gambler’s Fallacy is Not a Fallacy**

- Bochum Epistemology Seminar. Ruhr-University Bochum, June 2020.

### **Pandemic Polarization is Reasonable**

- Social (Distance) Epistemology. Northwestern University, April 2020.

### **Evidence of Evidence: A Higher-Order Approach** (Branden Fitelson & Brooke Husic)

- Foundations of Probability Seminar, Rutgers, May 2019.
- Ranch Metaphysics Workshop, Tucson, February 2019.
- The Significance of Higher-Order Evidence, University of Cologne, September 2018.
- Colloquium on Reasoning in a Social Context, University of Amsterdam, June 2018.

### **Abominable KK Failures**

- Central APA, Chicago, February 2018.

- The Northern New England Philosophical Association, Stonehill College, November 2017.

### **Two Cheers for Akrasia**

- Eastern APA (Symposium), Savannah, January 2018.

### **Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain**

- Formal Epistemology Workshop, University of Washington, May 2017.
- The St. Louis Area Conference on Reasons and Rationality, St. Louis, May 2017.
- The Society for Exact Philosophy, University of Calgary, May 2017.
- Pacific APA (Symposium), Seattle, April 2017.
- Northern New England Philosophical Association, Keene State University, October 2016.

### **Trustworthy E=K Implies KK**

- Mark Shapiro Graduate Conference, Brown University, November 2016.

### **Paradoxes of Higher-Order Evidence**

- Central APA (Symposium), Chicago, March 2016.
- Decisions, Games, and Logic, London, June 2015.
- NYU-Columbia Graduate Conference, NYU, March 2015.

### **A Contextualist Solution to Miner Disagreements**

- Eastern APA, Washington DC, January 2016. (Marc Sanders Graduate Student Award.)

### **Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy**

- Epistemic Consequentialism: Problems and Prospects, University of Kent, June 2015.
- Central APA, February 2015.

### **Graded Epistemic Logic and a Barrier to Entailment**

- The Philosophers' Cocoon Philosophy Conference, University of Tampa, July 2014.

## COMMENTS

- Sven Neth. 'Rational Aversion to Information'. Pacific APA, Vancouver, April 2022.
- Fabienne Peter. 'Political Deference'. Eastern APA, Baltimore, January 2022.
- Mason Westfall. 'Polarization is Epistemically Innocuous.' *This But Unironically*. Online. July 2021.
- James O. Weatherall. 'Why do Groups Polarize over Matters of Fact? What Models Can and Cannot Tell Us'. Yale Understanding the Nature of Inference Project, May 2021.
- David Thorstad, 'Norms of Inquiry,' Harvard Workshop on Bounded Rationality, Boston, October 2019.
- Nevin Climenhaga, 'The Structure of Epistemic Probabilities', Eastern APA, Baltimore, January 2017.

- Sophie Horowitz, ‘Epistemic Value and the “Jamesian Goals” ’, St. Louis Area Conference on Reasons and Rationality, St. Lous, May 2015.
  - Ray Briggs, ‘An Accuracy-Dominance Argument for Conditionalization’, MITing of the Minds, Cambridge MA, January 2015.
  - Bob Beddor, ‘An Attitudinal Semantics for Moral and Epistemic Evaluations’, Philosophers’ Cocoon Philosophy Conference, Tampa, July 2014.
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## TEACHING

### INSTRUCTOR

‘G’ = graduate; ‘U’ = undergraduate

- Theories of Knowledge and Reality (U). Spring 2022
  - Rationality (U). Spring 2022
  - The Epistemology of Bias (G). Fall 2021.
  - Rationality (G). Spring 2021.
  - Theory of Knowledge (U). Fall 2021; Spring 2021.
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## AWARDS

- University of Pittsburgh Summer Term Research Stipend, 2022. (Declined.)
  - MIT Graduate Student Council travel grants, 2017 and 2018.
  - Marc Sanders Graduate Student Award for ‘A Contextualist Solution to Miner Disagreements’.
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## SERVICE

- Member of the Pitt Diversity Committee, 2021–2022.
- Co-organizer of the Pittsburgh Formal Epistemology Workshop (PFEW), 2021 – 2022.
- Co-organizer of Oxford Philosophy of Probability Reading Group, Spring 2020 – Fall 2020.
- Tutor for Philosophy in an Inclusive Key Summer Institute (PIKSI) Logic at Northeastern University, Summer 2018.
- MIT Conference Czar, 2018 – 2019.
- Co-organizer of the MIT Graduate Workshop, 2016 – 2018.
- Co-organizer of the MIT Epistemology Reading Group, 2015 – 2017
- Co-organizer of Harvard/MIT Graduate Conference, 2015.

- Referee for: *The Philosophical Review*, *Noûs*, *Mind*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *The Journal of Philosophy*, *Ethics*, *The Australian Journal of Philosophy*, *Analysis*, *Philosophy of Science*, *Philosophical Studies*, *The British Journal for Philosophy of Science*, *The Journal of Philosophical Logic*, *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, *Routledge*, *Episteme*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Erkenntnis*, *Synthese*, *European Journal of Philosophy of Science*, and DFG (the German Research Foundation).

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## REFERENCES

Roger White (PhD advisor)

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