

KEVIN DORST

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AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION

Epistemology · Logic · Philosophy of Language

AREAS OF COMPETENCE

Ethics · Political Philosophy

EMPLOYMENT

Assistant Professor, University of Pittsburgh	2019 – present
Resident Fellow, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh	2019 – present
Fellow by Examination (JRF), Magdalen College, Oxford University	2019 – 2020

EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Minor: Mathematical Logic Dissertation: <i>Modest Epistemology</i> Committee: Roger White (Chair), Branden Fitelson, Kieran Setiya, Robert Stalnaker	2014 – 2019
B.A. in Philosophy & Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis <i>Summa Cum Laude</i> Thesis: <i>Reviving Joyce's Error Theory</i>	2010 – 2014

PUBLICATIONS

* = co-first-authors

- ‘Good Guesses.’ Forthcoming. Kevin Dorst* and Matthew Mandelkern*. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.
- ‘Deference Done Better.’ Forthcoming. Kevin Dorst*, Benjamin A. Levinstein*, Bernhard Salow*, Brooke Husic, and Branden Fitelson. *Philosophical Perspectives*.
- ‘Be modest: You’re living on the edge’. Forthcoming. *Analysis*.

- ‘Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain’. 2020. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. 100 (3): 586–632.
- ‘Abominable KK Failures’. 2019. *Mind* 128 (512): 1227–1259.
- ‘Higher-Order Uncertainty’. 2019. In M. Skipper and A. Steglich-Petersen (eds.), *Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays*, Oxford University Press, 35–61.
- ‘Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy’. 2019. *Mind* 128 (509): 175–211.
- ‘Can the Knowledge Norm Co-Opt the Opt-Out?’ 2014. *Thought* 3 (4): 273–282.

PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY

- ‘How America Polarized’. *Arc Digital*. February 3, 2021.
- *Stranger Apologies* blog, including the series *Reasonably Polarized: Why politics is more rational than you think*.
- ‘The Other Side is More Rational Than You Think’. *Arc Digital*. September 25, 2020.
- ‘The Rational Question’. *The Oxonian Review*. March 14, 2020.
- ‘Why Rational People Polarize’. *The Phenomenal World*. January 24, 2019

REVIEWS AND HANDBOOK ARTICLES

- ‘Higher-Order Evidence’. Forthcoming in Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook for the Philosophy of Evidence*, Routledge.
- *Epistemic Consequentialism* by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn (eds.). 2020. *Philosophical Review* 129 (3): 484–489.

REFEREED/INVITED PRESENTATIONS

Rational Polarization

- LanCog Group at the University of Lisbon, March 2021.
- Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, March 2021.
- University of Missouri, February 2021.
- University of Oxford Jowett Society, November 2019.
- Pacific APA, Vancouver, April 2019.
- National University of Singapore, February 2019.
- University of Pittsburgh, February 2019.
- Indiana University, January 2019.
- Prindle Institute for Ethics at Depauw University, June 2018.

Good Guesses (with Matthew Mandelkern)

- Society for Philosophy and Psychology (online). July 2021.
- *Sinn und Bedeutung*. University College London. September 2020.
- University of London Formal Philosophy Group. June 2020.

Being Rational and Being Wrong (Formerly: “Overconfidence in Overconfidence”)

- Fordham Epistemology and Ethics Workshop, Fordham University, September 2020.
- Formal Epistemology Workshop, University of California at Irvine, May 2020.
- Pacific APA (Symposium), San Francisco, April 2020. [Canceled due to Covid-19]
- LSE Choice Group. London, February 2020.
- University of Bristol, December 2019.
- Legal Epistemology Workshop, University of Sydney, August 2019.

The Gambler’s Fallacy is Not a Fallacy

- Bochum Epistemology Seminar. Ruhr-University Bochum, June 2020.

Pandemic Polarization is Reasonable

- Social (Distance) Epistemology. Northwestern University, April 2020.

Evidence of Evidence: A Higher-Order Approach (Branden Fitelson & Brooke Husic)

- Foundations of Probability Seminar, Rutgers, May 2019.
- Ranch Metaphysics Workshop, Tucson, February 2019.
- The Significance of Higher-Order Evidence, University of Cologne, September 2018.
- Colloquium on Reasoning in a Social Context, University of Amsterdam, June 2018.

Abominable KK Failures

- Central APA, Chicago, February 2018.
- The Northern New England Philosophical Association, Stonehill College, November 2017.

Two Cheers for Akrasia

- Eastern APA (Symposium), Savannah, January 2018.

Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain

- Formal Epistemology Workshop, University of Washington, May 2017.
- The St. Louis Area Conference on Reasons and Rationality, St. Louis, May 2017.
- The Society for Exact Philosophy, University of Calgary, May 2017.
- Pacific APA (Symposium), Seattle, April 2017.
- Northern New England Philosophical Association, Keene State University, October 2016.

Trustworthy E=K Implies KK

- Mark Shapiro Graduate Conference, Brown University, November 2016.

Paradoxes of Higher-Order Evidence

- Central APA (Symposium), Chicago, March 2016.
- Decisions, Games, and Logic, London, June 2015.
- NYU-Columbia Graduate Conference, NYU, March 2015.

A Contextualist Solution to Miner Disagreements

- Eastern APA, Washington DC, January 2016. (Marc Sanders Graduate Student Award.)

Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy

- Epistemic Consequentialism: Problems and Prospects, University of Kent, June 2015.
- Central APA, February 2015.

Graded Epistemic Logic and a Barrier to Entailment

- The Philosophers' Cocoon Philosophy Conference, University of Tampa, July 2014.

COMMENTS

- Mason Westfall. 'Polarization is Epistemically Innocuous.' This But Unironically (online), July 2021.
- James O. Weatherall. 'Why do Groups Polarize over Matters of Fact? What Models Can and Cannot Tell Us'. Yale Understanding the Nature of Inference Project, May 2021.
- David Thorstad, 'Norms of Inquiry,' Harvard Workshop on Bounded Rationality, Boston, October 2019.
- Nevin Climenhaga, 'The Structure of Epistemic Probabilities', Eastern APA, Baltimore, January 2017.
- Sophie Horowitz, 'Epistemic Value and the "Jamesian Goals" ', St. Louis Area Conference on Reasons and Rationality, St. Louis, May 2015.
- Ray Briggs, 'An Accuracy-Dominance Argument for Conditionalization', MITing of the Minds, Cambridge MA, January 2015.
- Bob Beddor, 'An Attitudinal Semantics for Moral and Epistemic Evaluations', Philosophers' Cocoon Philosophy Conference, Tampa, July 2014.

TEACHING

INSTRUCTOR

'G' = graduate course

- Rationality (G), Spring 2021
- Theory of Knowledge, Spring 2021
- Formal Methods in Epistemology. (Mini-course.) January 2017.

TEACHING ASSISTANT

- The Ethics of Climate Change (Hare, Setiya), Spring 2018
- Moral Problems and the Good Life (Setiya), Fall 2017
- Justice (Kates), Spring 2017.
- Ethics (Shapiro), Fall 2016
- Problems in Philosophy (Hare), Fall 2015

AWARDS

- M.A. by resolution, University of Oxford, 2019.
 - MIT Graduate Student Council travel grant, 2018.
 - MIT Graduate Student Council travel grant, 2017.
 - Marc Sanders Graduate Student Award for ‘A Contextualist Solution to Miner Disagreements’.
(Top 3 graduate student papers at the 2016 Eastern APA.)
 - Student Scholarship to attend NASSLLI 2016.
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SERVICE

- Member of the Pitt Diversity Committee, Summer 2021–present.
- Co-organizer of the Pittsburgh Formal Epistemology Workshop (PFEW), Spring 2021 – present.
- Co-organizer of Oxford Philosophy of Probability Reading Group, Spring 2020 – Fall 2020.
- MIT Conference Czar, 2018 – 2019.
- Co-organizer of the MIT Graduate Workshop, 2016 – 2018.
- Co-organizer of the MIT Epistemology Reading Group, 2015 – 2017
- Co-organizer of Harvard/MIT Graduate Conference, 2015.
- Referee for: *The Philosophical Review*, *Noûs*, *Mind*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *The Journal of Philosophy*, *Ethics*, *The Australian Journal of Philosophy*, *Analysis*, *Philosophy of Science*, *Philosophical Studies*, *The British Journal for Philosophy of Science*, *The Journal of Philosophical Logic*, *Routledge*, *Episteme*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Erkenntnis*, *Synthese*, *European Journal of Philosophy of Science*, and DFG (the German Research Foundation).