

20. Irrelevant Influences review

Kevin Dorst
kevindorst@pitt.edu

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Mills 2007:

- Race is a pervasive irrelevant influence on beliefs. Due to *standpoint theory*, it makes it so that (at a given time) White people have fewer reliable/true/justified beliefs about race than people of color. Because of White domination of cultural institutions, this ignorance perpetuates and exacerbates itself in the culture.

Potentially: awareness of this should lead us to revisit our views about race.

Begby 2018 and Siegel 2018:

- *Siegel*: a belief is *ill-founded* (doxastically unjustified) if it has a bad causal history. This gives a diagnosis of *culturally normal belief*—Whit's racist beliefs have a bad source, and so are unjustified.
- *Begby*: This norm is too externalist. What else should Whit believe? He's not blameworthy, since he couldn't have known better.
- *Siegel*: ill-foundedness does not imply blameworthiness. We need a concept of well-foundedness that explains what's wrong with Whit's culture even if things are symmetric.

Fricker 2007:

- *Epistemic Injustice* is a way of capturing a particular kind of problematic irrelevant influence. In particular, when we give less credibility to someone than they're owed in a way that is systematic, prejudicial, and identity-based, we've committed a core kind of *testimonial injustice*.

Potentially: awareness of this fact should lead us to revisit our standard credibility assessments.

Schoenfield 2020:

- To avoid bootstrapping: a belief formed by method *M* is justified only if it is recoverable from the perspective of doubt about *M*. But many of our social/political beliefs are *not* recoverable from the perspective of doubt. Therefore such beliefs are not justified.

Vavova 2018:

- The threat of debunking is distinctive but manageable. The threat arises when you have good, independent reason to think that you are MISTAKEN¹ (GIRP). This doesn't reduce to skepticism because the "Good Independent Reasons Principle" is not the same as the "No Independent Reasons Principle".

¹ Remember that this is a term of art!

Street 2015:

- Genealogical information about our beliefs is undermining when it reveals explanatory but no justificatory (“normative”) reasons for belief. If we think morality is *mind-independent*, then learning of evolutionary effects on our moral beliefs should lead us to doubt them.