

13. Disagreement review

Kevin Dorst
kevindorst@pitt.edu

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Feldman: Conciliationism; lose controversial beliefs.

What could ground reasonable disagreement?

- Different starting points?—No, pushes the problem back.
- Evidence not fully shared?—No, evidence of evidence is evidence.
- Think (wrongly) that other side is unreasonable?—No, if you have reasons for thinking so, share them; if not, stop.

Kelly: Right reasons; keep controversial beliefs (if rational!).

- The disagreement is *not* symmetric!
- What determines when we should worry about disagreement? The *reasons* for the disagreement.

Elga: Conciliationism; keep controversial beliefs.

- The Equal Weight View is right because otherwise bootstrapping would be rational.
- But you should not think those who disagree with you on *lots* of issues are your peers, so should not conciliate in those cases.

Notice: as polarization increases, even *less* pressure to conciliate!

McGrath: Conciliationism; lose controversial (moral) knowledge.

- Knowledge requires safety. Disagreement implies you could've easily been wrong. So you don't know.
- And: Since you *know* you don't know, you shouldn't believe either.
- Contra Elga, we *can* set aside large swaths of our beliefs, and still be able to say we easily could've been the one that's wrong.

And beliefs? Scientific ones?

Vavova: Conciliationism; keep *some* controversial (weak) beliefs.

- What determines whether to conciliate is how surprised you should've been by the disagreement.
- The more confident you are, the clearer you must think the evidence is, so the more surprised you should be.
- Therefore, it's the beliefs you are *unconfident* in that are most resilient to disagreement.