

13. Disagreement review

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Feldman: Conciliationism; lose controversial beliefs.

What could ground reasonable disagreement?

- 1) Different starting points?—No, pushes the problem back.
- 2) Evidence not fully shared?—No, evidence of evidence is evidence.
- 3) Think (wrongly) that other side is unreasonable?—No, if you have reasons for thinking so, share them; if not, stop.

Kelly: Right reasons; keep controversial beliefs (if rational!).

- The disagreement is *not* symmetric!
- What determines when we should worry about disagreement?
The *reasons* for the disagreement.

Elga: Conciliationism; keep controversial beliefs.

- EWV is right because otherwise bootstrapping would be rational.
- But you should not think those who disagree with you on *lots* of issues are your peers, so should not conciliate in those cases.

Notice: as polarization increases, even *less* pressure to conciliate!

McGrath: Conciliationism; lose controversial (moral) knowledge.

- Knowledge requires safety. Disagreement implies you could've easily been wrong. So you don't know.
- Possibly: Since you *know* you don't know, you shouldn't believe either.
- Contra Elga, we *can* set aside large swaths of our beliefs, and still be able to say we easily could've been the one that's wrong.

And beliefs? Scientific ones?

Christensen: Conciliationism; keep *some* controversial beliefs.

- In case of shared background, should give up confidence.
- In case of deep disagreements, have no positive reason to think reliable when you bracket everything, so shouldn't.
- In case of middling disagreements, depends on whether you can tell a debunking story against the other side.