Kevin Dorst

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Areas

AOS: Epistemology, Cognitive Science

AOC: Philosophy of Language, Social and Political Philosophy

Employment

Associate Professor with Tenure, MIT	2024 – present
Assistant Professor, MIT	2022 – 2024
Assistant Professor, University of Pittsburgh	2019 – 2022
Fellow by Examination (JRF), Magdalen College, Oxford University	2019 – 2020

Awards and Fellowships

Levitan Prize in the Humanities (MIT internal grant)	2026
Humboldt Research Fellowship, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy	2024 – 2025
Old Dominion Career Development Chair, MIT	2024
Resident Fellow, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh	2019 – 2022

Education

Ph.D. in Philosophy, MIT (Minor: Mathematical Logic) 2014 – 2019
Dissertation: *Modest Epistemology*
Committee: Roger White (Chair), Branden Fitelson, Kieran Setiya, Robert Stalnaker

B.A. in Philosophy & Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis 2010 – 2014
Summa Cum Laude. Thesis: *Reviving Joyce's Error Theory*

Publications

* = co-first-authors

18. Forthcoming. 'Cognitive Noise Generates Higher-Order Uncertainty'. *Philosophical Quarterly.*
17. 2026. 'Bayesians Commit the Gambler's Fallacy'. *Cognitive Science 50(1): e70171.*
16. 2025. 'Reflection, Introspection, and Book'. Kevin Zollman* and Kevin Dorst*. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.* 111 (3): 1136–1158.

15. 2025. 'On the Robustness and Provenance of the Gambler's Fallacy.' Yang Xiang, Kevin Dorst, and Samuel Gershman. *Psychological Science*. 36 (6): 451–464.
14. 2025. 'The Conjunction Fallacy: Confirmation or Relevance?' WooJin Chung, Kevin Dorst, Matthew Mandelkern, and Salvador Mascarenhas. *Thinking and Reasoning* 31 (1): 82–108.
13. 2023. 'Rational Polarization'. *The Philosophical Review* 132 (3): 355–458.
    Selected for the *Philosopher's Annual* ("top 10" philosophy papers published in 2023).
12. 2023. 'Being Rational and Being Wrong'. *Philosophers' Imprint* 23 (3): 1–25.
11. 2022. 'Splitting the (In)Difference: Why Fine-Tuning Supports Design'. Chris Dorst* and Kevin Dorst*. *Thought*. 11 (1): 14–23.
10. 2022. 'Good Guesses'. Kevin Dorst* and Matthew Mandelkern*. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. 105 (3): 581–618
9. 2022. '(Almost) All Evidence is Higher-Order Evidence'. Brian Hedden* and Kevin Dorst*. *Analysis* 82 (3): 417–425.
8. 2022. 'Assertion is Weak'. Matthew Mandelkern and Kevin Dorst. *Philosophers' Imprint* 22 (19): 1–20 .
7. 2021. 'Be modest: You're living on the edge'. *Analysis* 81 (4): 611-621.
6. 2021. 'Deference Done Better'. Kevin Dorst*, Benjamin A. Levinstein*, Bernhard Salow*, Brooke Husic, and Branden Fitelson. *Philosophical Perspectives* 35 (1): 99-150.
5. 2020. 'Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain'. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. 100 (3): 586–632.
4. 2019. 'Abominable KK Failures'. *Mind* 128 (512): 1227–1259.
3. 2019. 'Higher-Order Uncertainty'. In M. Skipper and A. Steglich-Petersen (eds.), *Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays*, Oxford University Press, 35–61.
2. 2019. 'Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy'. *Mind* 128 (509): 175–211.
1. 2014. 'Can the Knowledge Norm Co-Opt the Opt-Out?' *Thought* 3 (4): 273–282.

Public Writing

- *Stranger Apologies* blog, including the series *Reasonably Polarized: Why politics is more rational than you think*.
- 'How America Polarized'. *Arc Digital*. February 3, 2021.
- 'The Other Side is More Rational Than You Think'. *Arc Digital*. September 25, 2020.
- 'The Rational Question'. *The Oxonian Review*. March 14, 2020.
- 'Why Rational People Polarize'. *Phenomenal World*. January 24, 2019

Reviews and Handbook Articles

- 'Higher-Order Evidence'. 2024. Iin Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook for the Philosophy of Evidence*, Routledge, 176–194.
- Review of *Epistemic Consequentialism* by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn (eds.). 2020. *Philosophical Review* 129 (3): 484–489.

Erdos number: 4. (Dorst → Husic → Wales → Salamon → Erdos.)

Recent Presentations

Should We Blame Our Political Opponents?

- Keynote at University of Florida Graduate Philosophy Conference, Gainesville, April 2026

Accurate Judgments Drive Polarization

- Human Cooperation Lab, MIT, December 2025
- MIT Corporation quarterly meeting, MIT, December 2025
- Center for Sustainability Science and Strategy Lunch Talk, MIT, November 2025
- Mitsui Mission (Mitsui Interbusiness Research Institute visit to MIT), November 2025
- Perspectives on Perspectives, Princeton, October 2025

A Theory of Confirmation Bias

- Princeton, Seminar on Moral Paradigm Shifts (Buchak and Harman), April 2026
- FAX5 (Formal and Experimental Philosophy), Lake Forest College, March 2026
- Computational Cognitive Science Lab (Tenenbaum), MIT, March 2026
- Computational Cognitive Neuroscience Lab (Gershman), Harvard, October 2025
- The Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU Munich, June 2025
- The London School of Economics, May 2025
- Northeastern Ethics Institute Speaker Series, March 2025

Ambiguity Drives Hindsight Bias

- Vanderbilt Social and Political Thought Workshop, March 2025
- Lombrozo Lab, Princeton, February 2025
- Epistemic Utility for Imprecise Probabilities, final conference, Bristol, December 2024
- Northeastern Epistemic Logic Workshop, November 2024
- Computational Cognitive Neuroscience Lab (Gershman), Harvard, October 2024
- Human Cooperation Lab (Rand), MIT, September 2024
- CUBES seminar, University of Queensland, September 2024
- Foundations of Decision Theory, MCMP, Munich, June 2024

The Natural Selection of Bad Vibes

- Agent Based Modeling Workshop, MCMP, Munich, June 2024

Clarity and Ambiguity

- University of Bristol, May 2024
- Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, April 2024
- Workshop on Reflection, UC Irvine. February 2024

Ideological Bayesians

- Central APA (online), February 2025
- PPE society annual meeting, New Orleans, November 2024
- PPE speaker series, UNC, November 2024
- Forecasting Research Institute, March 2024

Bayesians Commit the Gambler's Fallacy

- The International Conference on Thinking, Milan, June 2024
- UC Irvine, February 2024
- Computational Cognitive Neuroscience Lab, Harvard University, November 2023
- Formal and Experimental Philosophy (FAX3), University of Missouri, October 2023
- National University of Singapore Formal Epistemology Workshop. May 2023.
- University of Birmingham Philosophical Society. April 2023
- Pittsburgh Formal Epistemology Workshop. April 2023
- Bochum Epistemology Seminar. Ruhr-University Bochum, June 2020

Teaching

Undergraduate

- Topics in Philosophy. Fall 2025.
- Problems in Philosophy. Fall 2022; Spring 2022.
- Rationality. Fall 2024; Fall 2023; Spring 2022
- Theory of Knowledge. Fall 2021; Spring 2021.

Graduate

- *Reasonably Polarized: A Bayesian Theory of Bias.* Fall 2025.
- *Knowledge and its Limits* and its Limits (with Jack Spencer). Fall 2024.
- Imprecision and Irrationality (with Caspar Hare). Fall 2023.
- The Epistemology of Controversy (with Roger White). Fall 2022.
- The Epistemology of Bias. Fall 2021.
- Rationality. Spring 2021.

Service

- Steering committee for the Formal and Experimental (FAX) workshop, 2026–
- Steering committee for the Formal Epistemology Workshop (FEW), 2026–
- Organizer of Adaptive Decision-Making Workshop, MIT, 2023

- Organizer of the Formal Epistemology Workshop (FEW), 2023
- Organizer of the Formal and Experimental Philosophy Workshop (FAX2), 2022
- Member of the Pitt Diversity Committee, 2021–2022.
- Organizer of the Pittsburgh Formal Epistemology Workshop (PFEW), 2021 – 2022.
- Organizer of Oxford Philosophy of Probability Reading Group, Spring 2020 – Fall 2020.
- Tutor for Philosophy in an Inclusive Key Summer Institute (PIKSI) Logic at Northeastern University, Summer 2018.
- MIT Conference Czar, 2018 – 2019.
- Organizer of the MIT Graduate Workshop, 2016 – 2018.
- Organizer of the MIT Epistemology Reading Group, 2015 – 2017
- Organizer of Harvard/MIT Graduate Conference, 2015.
- Referee for: *The Philosophical Review*, *Noûs*, *Mind*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *The Journal of Philosophy*, *Ethics*, PLOS ONE, *The Australian Journal of Philosophy*, *Analysis*, *Philosophy of Science*, *Philosophical Studies*, *The British Journal for Philosophy of Science*, *The Journal of Philosophical Logic*, *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, *Review of Philosophy and Psychology Routledge*, *Episteme*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Erkenntnis*, *Synthese*, *European Journal of Philosophy of Science*, and DFG (the German Research Foundation).