I'm a PhD candidate in philosophy at MIT. I work on epistemology, logic, language, and their intersections.
In epistemology, I'm interested in what we should think (the belief-credence connection), why we should think it (foundations), and what we should think about what we should think (higher-order evidence). In logic, I'm interested in various models of these things—especially combinations of probability theory and epistemic logic. In language, I'm interested in various statements about them—especially the semantics and pragmatics behind ascriptions of belief, knowledge, and probability.
My dissertation is on higher-order evidence—evidence about what you should think. Part one argues that it's pervasive and important, but that our current theories wind up in triviality or paradox. Part two uses tools from probabilistic epistemic logic to propose a middle way: so long as we trust the evidence, higher-order information is both nontrivial and valuable. Part three will explore consequences and applications.